It may be proper to premise that the pressure of necessity and distress (and not corruption) had
a principal tendency to induce the adoption of the state constitutions and the existing confederation;
that power was even then vested in the rulers with the greatest caution; and that, as from every
circumstance we have reason to infer that the Dew constitution does not originate from a pure source,
we ought deliberately to trace the extent and tendency of the trust we are about to repose, under the
conviction that a reassumption of that trust will at least be difficult, if not impracticable. If we take
a retrospective view of the measures of Congress. . . . we can scarcely entertain a doubt but that a plan
has long since been framed to subvert the confederation; that that plan has been matured with the most
persevering industry and unremitted attention; and that the objects expressed in the preamble to the
constitution, that is "to promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves
and our posterity," were merely the ostensible....
I have been anxiously expecting that some enlightened patriot would, ere this, have taken up the pen to expose
the futility, and counteract the baneful tendency of such principles. Mr. Adams' sine qua non of a good government
is three balancing powers; whose repelling qualities are to produce an equilibrium of interests, and thereby
promote the happiness of the whole community. He asserts that the administrators of every government, will ever
be actuated by views of private interest and ambition, to the prejudice of the public good; that therefore the only
effectual method to secure the rights of the people and promote their welfare, is to create an opposition of interests
between the members of two distinct bodies, in the exercise of the powers of government, and balanced by those of a third.
This hypothesis supposes human wisdom competent to the task of instituting three co-equal orders in government, and a corresponding
weight in the community to enable them respectively to exercise their several parts, and whose views and interests should be so distinct....
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Where Then is the Restrain?
Let us look to the first article of the proposed new constitution, which treats of the legislative
powers of Congress; and to the eighth section, which pretends to define those powers. We find here
that the Congress in its legislative capacity, shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties,
and excises; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to fix the rule for naturalization and the laws of
bankruptcy; to coin money; to punish counterfeiters; to establish post offices and post roads; to secure
copy rights to authors; to constitute tribunals; to define and punish piracies; to declare war; to raise
and support armies; to provide and support a navy; to call forth the militia; to organize, arm and discipline
the militia; to exercise absolute power over a district ten miles square, independent of all the State
legislatures, and to be alike absolute over all forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful
buildings thereunto belonging. This is a short abstract of the powers given to Congress. These powers are very extensive....
This is a power co-extensive with every possible object of human legislation. Yet there is no restraint, no
charter of rights, no residuum of human privileges, not intended to be given up to society. The rights of conscience,
the freedom of the press, and trial by jury, are at the mercy of this senate. Trial by jury has been already materially injured.
The trial in criminal cases is not by twelve men of the vicinage, or of the county, but of the state; and the states are from fifty
to seven hundred miles in extent! In criminal cases this new system says, the trial shall be by jury. On civil cases it is silent.
There it is fair to infer, that as in criminal cases it has been materially impaired, in civil cases it may be altogether omitted.
But it is in truth, strongly discountenanced in civil cases; for this new system gives the supreme court in matters of appeal, jurisdiction
both of law and fact....
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